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INTRODUCTION

"The road to hell is paved with good intentions"
On April 20th, 2010, an explosion on the oil rig Deepwater Horizon
sparked a massive search and rescue operation in the Gulf of Mexico.2
The next day, eleven men remained missing. 3 With media attention
largely focused on the rescue effort, the majority owner of the rig,
British Petroleum PLC (BP), released an official statement asserting
that the rig's oil and gas were burning up in the blaze, minimizing
environmental harm. 4 But in the words of one BP official, "that does
have the potential to change."
Today, the BP Oil Spill is considered the worst environmental
disaster in our nation's history.6 The statistics are staggering. Three
months following the April blowout, independent scientific estimates
placed the number of barrels spewed into the Gulf at more than 4.9
million. Within four months, 3,090 birds and 270 sea turtles had been
reported visibly oiled, and 3,765 were found dead. Other estimates
1. CHRISTINE AMMER, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF IDIOMS 542 (1997) ("Wellintended acts can have disastrous results, as in She tried to help by defending Dad'sposition and
they haven't spoken since-the road to hell is paved with good intentions. This proverbial idiom
probably derives from a similar statement by St. Bernard of Clairvaux about 1150, L'enfer est
plein de bonnes volontis ou disirs ('Hell is full of good intentions or wishes'), and has been
repeated ever since.").
2. Campbell Robertson, Search Continues After Oil Rig Blast, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22rig.html?_r-1.

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill
(June 15, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentnation-bp-oil-spill ("Already, this oil spill is the worst environmental disaster America has ever
faced.").
7. Campbell Robertson, U.S. Puts Oil Spill Total at Nearly 5 Million Barrels, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.-nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03flow.html.
8.

U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., DEPT. OF INTERIOR, DEEPWATER HORIZON RESPONSE

CONSOLIDATED FISH AND WILDLIFE COLLECTION REPORT, (2010), available at http://www.fws.

gov/home/dhoilspill/pdfs/collection_0801201 0.pdf.
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bring total large-animal deaths to nearly 5,000.9 The massive response
effort involved some 28,40010 personnel and over 4,000 ships" to
clean-up more than 3,800 square-miles1 2 of Gulf waters and coastline.
The estimated immediate cost to the U.S. fishing industry stood at $2.5
billion 3 by summer's end, in addition to a $23 billion loss to the Gulf
Coast tourism industry.14
Yet the greatest challenges for the Gulf lie ahead. By late summer,
the number of federal lawsuits filed against BP, as well as against the
second and third largest shareholders of the rig, Transocean and
Halliburton, stood at 300.'s Of course, the BP Oil Spill is not the first to
trigger a flood of litigation. In 1989, the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
(EVOS) unleashed litigation spanning some two decades, ending when
the U.S. Supreme Court slashed punitive damages against Exxon by
90%.16 As litigation continued through the years, sociologists
documented how the Alaskan communities at the heart of the suit
gradually tore apart at the seams.
This Note argues that the experience of EVOS plaintiffs
foreshadows what is to come for Gulf Coast communities and
individual residents filing suit against BP today. It also sets forth a
controversial thesis: the adversarial court system, the very institution
many victims of technological disasters' 8 turn to for help, prolongs
victims' trauma for years and sometimes decades, after the disaster
comes to an official end.'b Nevertheless, this Note asserts that such a
9. Alice-Azania Jarvis, BP Oil Spill: Disaster by Numbers, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 14,
2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/bp-oil-spill-disaster-by-numbers-2078396.
html (reporting 4,768 as the number of dead animals collected as of August 13th, 2010, of
which 4,080 were birds and 525 were sea turtles).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. W. Paul Anderson & Edward T. Hayes, The BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster:An
Overview of Immediate and Long-Term Legal and Environmental Consequences (Sept. 2010),
http://www.leake andersson.com/images/pubs/42.pdf.
16. See Adam Liptak, Damages Cut Against Exxon in Valdez Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 26,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22rig.html?r-2 (reporting that the Court
slashed punitive damages against Exxon from five billion dollars to five hundred million,
resulting in a total of thirty thousand for each of the thirty-two thousand plaintiffs after twenty
years of litigation).
17. See generally J. Steven Picou, When the Solution Becomes the Problem: The Impacts
of AdversarialLitigation on Survivors of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 68
(2009) (presenting and analyzing data the initial trauma of the disaster was superseded by
protracted litigation over twenty years).
18. Brent K. Marshall et al., Technological Disasters, Litigation Stress, and the Use of
Alternative DisputeResolution Mechanisms, 26 LAW & POLICY 289, 291 (2004).
19. See generallyPicou, supra note 17.
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fate is by no means inevitable. Viable options exist for litigators and
policymakers to mitigate or avoid altogether the unforeseen
consequences of long-term mass-torts litigation.
Part I discerns the lessons of EVOS. It sets forth the background of
the disaster, makes a crucial distinction between natural and
technological disasters, and takes a hard look at Exxon's litigation
strategy.
Part II examines the phenomenon of protracted litigation as a
"second disaster" after the 1989 spill and concludes by analyzing the
legal impact of EVOS, including the expansion of the oil pollution and
the Supreme Court decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker.20
Part III compares the BP Oil Spill to EVOS. It also defines the
victims of the BP Oil Spill and examines evidence from Legal Services
of North Florida2 1 of community corrosion in Florida. Part III also
explains why current legislation and the major alternative to litigation,
the BP Claims Process, do not target the underlying problem that arises
post-disaster: community corrosion.
Finally, Part IV proposes new alternatives and models for litigators
and policymakers to consider, which head off community corrosion and
make government a trustee of the very communities it is intended to
protect.
I. TROUBLING LESSONS FROM THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL

A. Background
Twenty-one years before the BP Oil Spill, a supertanker, owned and
operated by Exxon Valdez, ran aground on Bligh Reef, Prince William
Sound, Alaska.22 With a response plan virtually nonexistent,23 a winter
20. 128 S. Ct. at 2605, 2634 (2008) (holding, for the purposes of this Note, that punitive
damages should be capped at no greater than the total compensatory damages awarded at trial).
Baker established a cap on punitive damages that will undoubtedly be tested by the current BP
spill-related litigation. See generally Jim Gash, The End ofan Era: The Supreme Court (Finally)
Butts Out of Punitive Damages for Good, 63 FLA. L. REV. 525 (2011) (hailing the cap on
punitive damage awards in Baker as indication of the Court's withdrawal from punitive damage
issues). But see Patrick L. Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damage
Awards: "Morals Without Technique"?, 60 FLA. L. REv. 349 (Apr. 2008) (arguing that the
Court's trend toward capping punitive damages through substantive due process only increases
confusion at the trial level and is morally suspect).
21. Legal Services of North Florida is part of the federal Legal Services Corp. and
provides the indigent of Pensacola Bay access to free legal services. For more information, see
Legal Services of North Florida, http://www.1snf.org/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
22. See Picou, supra note 17, at 68.
23. Id.
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storm quickly spread eleven million gallons of crude oil 24 throughout
the region, eliminating thousands of wildlife over 1,300 miles of
coastline. The impact of the spill went far beyond the immediate
environmental toll, and victims witnessed the "intimate social fabric" 26
of their communities unravel.2 7 The causes of this unraveling have been
the focus of much debate, but decades of scientific research points to
key characteristics of the Exxon disaster and the ensuing litigation
battle, which serve as difficult lessons for victims of the BP Oil Spill.
B. A TechnologicalDisaster
Typologyplays a determining role in what the aftermath of a disaster
Disasters are categorized as either natural or
looks like.2
2
9
technological. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill or EVOS fits squarely into
the latter category, 30 setting the staqe for what would happen to Alaskan
communities in the years to come.
Technological disasters are purely man-made events. Associated
with willful and wanton negligence,3 they are the toxic leaks, powerplant meltdowns and, of course, oil spills of the world.3 4 In contrast,
natural disasters are "acts of God."3 5 They lack any one human entity to
blame, if any at all.36 Natural disasters are also more predictable and
possess finality.3 7 At some point, the storm will end.
Even sharper distinctions arise when the respective aftermaths of
these disasters are compared. Natural disasters often have the
unintended consequence of creating a "therapeutic community."3 8 This
"therapeutic community" can be described as a coming together of
former strangers to provide immediate assistance and services that aid
24. See Liptak, supra note 16.
25. Id.
26. Picou, supra note 17, at 69.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 70 (contrasting natural and technological disasters, followed by an analysis of
their impact upon disaster victims).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 71.
31. Id. at 70-72.
32. Id. at 70.
33. Id. ("In contrast, technological disasters involve anthropogenic causes associated with
careless, irresponsible, or reckless behavior.").
34. Id. at 71.
35. See id. at 70 ("Natural disasters originate from meteorological and seismological
events that are generally beyond human control.").
36. Id.
37. Id. (stating that in natural disasters "an 'all clear' signal sounds that alerts survivors
that the disaster has ended").
38. Id.
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in the recovery process. 39 Therapist Pam Maumenee, a member of the
Oil Crisis Team at AltaPointe Health Systems in Bayou La Batre,
Alabama, put it this way: "[e]verybody comes out after a hurricane. You
clean up. You bond together."4 The exact opposite is true in a manmade disaster.41
Dr. Steven J. Picou, a sociologist from the University of South
Alabama,4 2 has spent decades following the Alaskan communities most
adversely affected by the Exxon Spill.4 3 His research builds upon the
growing consensus amongst emergency management personnel and
social scientists44 that technological disasters produce an enduring
pattern of economic, cultural, social and psychological harm. 4 5 in
technological disasters, Picou writes, "[w]hat you see are families
against families, brothers against sisters, neighbors against neighbors
... [such that] [t]he community becomes quite corrosive." 46 Thus, this
typology leaves "corrosive communities'A7 in its wake.
Part of the explanation for the appearance of these corrosive
communities may have something to do with the dispersal of invisible
contaminants,4 8 the impact of which is often delayed. In Cordoba,
Alaska, an isolated commercial fishing town in Prince William Sound,
the herring population collapsed five years after the spill. 49 As one of
39. Id.
40. See Debbie Elliot & Marisa Penaloza, BP Spill PsychologicalScars Similar to Exxon
Valdez, NAT. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/12/01/131694848/bp-spillpsychological-scars-similar-to-exxon-valdez.
41. Id.
42. Picou is the author of four books, twenty-two book chapters and over seventy articles
focusing on the sociological aspects of disasters. For more information on Dr. Picou, including
how to contact him, see his academic at website at http://www.steven picou.com/ (last visited
July 30, 2011).
43. See Picou, supra note 17, at 74.
44. Id. at 70.
45. See Marshall et al., supra note 18.
46. Id.; Elliot & Penaloza, supra note 40.
47. Picou et al., Disaster, Litigation, and the Corrosive Community, 82 Soc. FORCES
1493, 1496 (2004) [hereinafter Picou, Disaster Litigation]. Picou also describes the corrosive
community effect as a "consistent pattern of chronic impacts to individuals and communities."
Id.
48. Id.
49. See Evelyn D. Brown & Mark G. Carls, Pacific Herring, "Restoration Notebook,"
EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE CON., Sept. 1998, available at http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/

Universal/Documents/Publications/RestorationNotebook/RN_
the following discovery:

her ring.pdf. Researchers made

Prior to the EVOS, the population in [Prince William Sound] was at a high
level and increasing. Estimates of the biomass of spawning adult herring
since the 1980s range from a low of 16,400 metric tons in 1994 to a high of
113,200 metric tons in 1989. The 1989 year class failed to join the spawning
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the area's most profitable catch,50 the collapse sent yet another
economic and psychological tremor through the community.
Nevertheless, long-lasting psychological scars are the most telling
hallmark of corrosive communities. 5 ' Consider the testimony of Jennifer
Gibbins, President of the Cordoba, Alaska Chamber of Commerce, as
she described the aftermath of the Exxon spill before a Senate Judiciary
Committee:
After the spill, there were divorces, suicides, there were
families that lost everything they had and more than a few left.
Men will speak of the psychological struggle due to loosing[sic]
their identity as family provider.
I had one friend, now 50, who has described to me of sinking
into a mental abyss over the years following the spill when his
wife had to become the sole breadwinner for the family. He was
so affected that he began to fantasize about killing her.
Fortunately he got to a therapist. 52
Stories like these became common in Prince William Sound.s3 In the
population in [Prince William Sound] in 1993, and only about 25% [sic] of
the forecasted return of adults actually returned. As a result of this dramatic
population collapse, [Prince William Sound] herring fisheries were curtailed
in 1993 and closed from 1994-1996.
Id. (citations omitted).
50. Id.
51. Steven Picou provided a more expansive description of the corrosive community
effect in a 2010 online interview:
Chronic economic impacts systematically invade the social fabric, causing a
cascade of social pathology for communities, families and individuals. The
sociological lessons of the Exxon Valdez for the human condition clearly
document this fact. Because of fear and uncertainty regarding the ecological
consequences of the Exxon Valdez, intense social conflict emerged within
communities, causing the fragmentation and marginalization of various groups.
Dahr Jamail, Gulf Residents Likely Face Decades of Psychological Impact From BP's Oil
Disaster,GLOBALRESEARCH.CA (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context
=va&aid=20504.
52. Continuation of the Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2010)
[hereinafter Gibbins Testimony] (testimony of Jennifer Gibbins, Cordoba, Alaska Chamber of
Commerce), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5
476862f735da I5fcl43&wit id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735dal5fc143-1-2.
53. Take for instance the case of Garland Blanchard, a third-generation fisherman whose
marriage collapsed as he lost his livelihood, two boats, his home and even his pets. See
Christopher Maag, In Alaska, Rage and Sorrow over Decision, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/26/us/alaska.html.
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aftermath of the Exxon disaster, thirteen people took their own lives, the
majority in Cordoba. 54 Yet, the social stresses of EVOS55 were
amplified in communities like Cordoba because of their inextricable
link to the environment. 56 Picou labels such communities "renewable
resource communities" or RRCs.57 In EVOS, RRCs were composed of
multi-generational commercial fishing towns and Native American
fishing villages. The EVOS RRCs were cash economies with little
occupational variety outside the commercial fishing industry. 59 Cordoba
has been called "sociological ground zero" because its health was
significantly connected to that of Prince William Sound60-and suffered
perhaps the worse because of it.6 1
Mental health studies conducted by Picou and his colleagues in
Cordoba illustrate a broad psychological and emotional toll. Five
months after the disaster, 15% of Cordoba residents expressed severe
mental health issues, 11% expressed sub-clinical issues, and 37%
respectively experienced mild or moderate symptoms. 62 Six years later,
in 1995, a mental health study of fishermen found that 13% of female
and 23% of male fishermen exhibited clinical levels of anxiety.63
Furthermore, 39% of men and 20% of women had clinical depression
and one out of every three commercial fishermen exhibited symptoms
54. See Jamail, supra note 51.
55. EVOS is the abbreviation for Exxon Valdez Oil Spill.
56. Picou, supra note 17, at 69.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 72.
59. Picou completes the picture of the most vulnerable RRC in EVOS' wake:
Commercial fishing is the primary economic activity and a wide variety of
support occupations (e.g., net mending, vessel electronics, boat repair, and fish
processing) provide a network of jobs that organizes the occupational structure.
Although other sources of revenue are available (e.g., tourism, education, state
agency employment, or the sale of nonrenewable resources) such jobs are
extremely limited and provide minimal economic support to the community.
Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 79:
[F]our years after the EVOS, sociological research clearly documented that
commercial fishermen and Alaska Natives were the two groups who were at
high risk for chronic social and psychological impacts. Both groups were
intimately linked to the contaminated waters of Prince William Sound.
Commercial fishermen were linked economically to the various salmon and
herring fisheries, while Alaska Natives were linked culturally through their
various seasonal subsistence harvests.
62. See Elliot & Penaloza, supranote 40.
63. Picou, supra note 17, at 79.
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of post-traumatic stress disorder or PTSD.64
Clearly, the impact of technological disasters, like EVOS, resonates
far beyond the initial spill and fundamentally alters the environment in a
way that directly impacts community health. However, the aftermath of
the Exxon spill itself would soon be compounded by the aggressive
defense of a deep-pocketed defendant.
C. A Concise Overview ofExxon's Litigation Strategy: Delay,
Delay, Appeal, Appeal
In the early days of EVOS, Exxon made public assurances to the
communities of Prince William Sound and specifically to Cordoba that
they were "lucky this was Exxon." 65 However, those public assurances
proved to be empty promises and, according to residents, outright lies.66
Just days after their supertanker impaled itself on Blight Reef, the
Chairman of Exxon admitted his company had committed a "gross
error" in permitting the captain of the Exxon Valdez to command the
vessel while intoxicated.6 Yet, the legal battle over liability lasted
twenty years and ended in major defeat for EVOS victims.
In 1994, a jury awarded $287 million in compensatory damages and
another $5 billion in punitive damages in a class action filed on behalf
of spill victims. 69 In response, Exxon filed repeated motions to overturn
the verdict, which delayed final judgment another two years. During
this two-year period, plaintiffs lost roughly $700,000 in interest off of
their trial award each and every day, 7 1 as the lawyers of Exxon
continued to delay 72 filing an appeal with the Ninth Circuit. In 2001, the
64. Id.
65. Gibbons Testimony, supra note 52.
66. Id. ("[T]he more than 32,000 victims of the Exxon Valdez spill were never made
whole as Exxon promised. Regardless of compensatory or punitive dollars, life[,] as they knew
it[,] was permanently and irrevocably altered.").
67. Picou, supra note 17, at 68-69.
68. See Liptak, supra note 16 (reporting that the Supreme Court slashed punitive
damages against Exxon from five billion dollars to five hundred million, resulting in an average
of thirty thousand dollars for each of the 32,000 plaintiffs after twenty years); see generally
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (holding by the majority that punitive
damages should be capped at a one-to-one ratio); Gibbons Testimony, supra note 52 ("[Tlhe
more than 32,000 victims of the Exxon Valdez spill were never made whole as Exxon promised.
Regardless of compensatory or punitive dollars, life[,J as they knew it[,] was permanently and
irrevocably altered.").
69. Picou, supra note 17, at 74.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The Anchorage DailyNews had this to say on Exxon's delay tactic in 1998:
Apparently, delay pays. Exxon is earning $90,000 an hour, about $2 million a
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Ninth Circuit ruled against Exxon, except when it came to the question
of whether the trial jury's award of $5 billion in punitive damages was
excessive. 73 On this point, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Exxon, but it
would take another five years for the court to define just what
"excessive" entailed.7 4 In 2006, punitive damages were cut by half, to
$2.5 billion.7 s Again, Exxon appealed.
In 2008, the case Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker came before the
United States Supreme Court. 77 In a 5-to-3 decision,7 8 the Court slashed
the remaining punitive damages to $507 million. 79 Writing for the
majority, Justice Souter found that, under common law, no more than a
one-to-one ratio is appropriate between compensatory and punitive
damages, at least in maritime cases.8 0 From the initial compensatory
award the plaintiffs had already received roughly $15,000 each by this
time. 8f The Baker decision would provide them merely an additional
$15,000 for a decade and a half worth of litigation.82
In 1989, Exxon promised the victims of their disaster that the
company would "'make them whole' and that litigation 'would not go
[on] for 20 years."' 83 Yet, reality saw the employment of an
aggressive-and successful-defense strategy 84 that produced very
day or nearly $800 million a year, on the same $5 billion as long as the case
drags on and the money stays in its coffers. As it stands now, if the appeals
linger a couple more years, Exxon will have earned enough interest alone to
pay the $5 billion plus the accrued interest.
Marshall et al., supra note 18, at 294 (citations omitted).
73. Id.
74. In re Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d 600, 624-25 (9th Cir. 2006).
75. Id. at 625.
76. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,481 (2008).
77. 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
78. Justice Samuel Alito recused himself because of his ownership of Exxon stock. Id. at
474, 514; Robert Barnes, Justices Assess FinancialDamages in Exxon Valdez Case, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 27, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/02/27/AR2008022700299_pf.html.
79. Baker, 554 U.S. at 515.
80. See id. at 513; see infra Part II.B.
81. Liptak, supra note 16.
82. Id.
83. Gibbins Testimony, supra note 52.
84. Exxon's litigation strategy has been summarized as follows:
1.
2.

Retain the best attorneys money can buy and aggressively attack plaintiffs
in every manner possible.
Hire scientists to collect and analyze data in an effort to "debunk" damage
claims made by independent and/or plaintiff-sponsored scientists, thus
creating "reasonable doubt" through the selective use of "scientific
uncertainty."
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different results for the already devastated communities of Prince
William Sound.

II.

THE SECOND SPILL & PRECEDENTIAL BLOWOUT

A. Litigationas the "SecondDisaster"
Up to this point, two things are clear. First, the aftermath of a
technological disaster is more destructive than that of a natural
disaster. Second, Exxon executed an aggressive defense strategy that
resulted in one of the longest court battles in history. 86 Standing alone,
each is capable of destruction. However, in EVOS, the two formed a
perfect storm.
Studies conducted from the disaster in 1989 to the 2008 Supreme
Court decision in Baker conclude that litigation unleashed a corrosive
social pattern that persisted over a decade and became the single
greatest source of "late-onset community disruption and psychological
stress."87 Litigation produced an "independent secondary disaster,"
which continued to inflict trauma upon the victims of EVOS long after
the initial disaster in 1989.88

To prove this point, Picou and his fellow researchers followed a
sample group of Cordoba residents from the disaster to present day. 89
To measure what was termed "community damage," or the impact of
EVOS on Cordoba, the researchers isolated five factors, namely work
disruption (a period of unemployment following the spill), litigation

3.

4.
5.

6.

Marshall
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Deny all non-economic damage claims by attacking the credibility of
independent and/or plaintiff sponsored social scientists and preventing this
data from being admitted as court evidence.
Use biased accounting strategies to overestimate costs to the defendants
and underestimate the damages to victims.
Hire law professors and other legal scholars to publish legal position
papers that support "legitimate" claims against punitive damages and
monitor relevant, ongoing legal cases.
Organize a massive public relations campaign that "deconstructs" what
really happened and "reconstructs" an "all clear signal," pronouncing that
the spill damages are gone and all victims (ecological and human) have
recovered.

et al., supra note 18, at 295.
See supra Part I.B.
See Liptak, supra note 16.
See Picou, supra note 17, at 81.
See id.
Id.
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stress, recreancy, 90 "oil spill risk" or the perception of vulnerability to
another oil spill, and the level of psychological or emotional attachment
the individual had to their community. 9 ' A regression was then
completed on the survey results and a trend was clear: stress from
litigation was the most statistically significant factor in the community's
perception as to what was damaging it the most.92
Startling also is the rift Picou's results expose between litigants and
non-litigants. 93 Consistently, litigants indicated higher levels of work
disruption, litigation stress, recreancy, fear of another oil spill, and the
perception of community damage.9 4 However, compared to nonlitigants, litigants perceived less attachment to their own community. 95
It is difficult to extrapolate the reasons as to why without knowing
whether the difference in this category is statistically significant, but if
it were, a self-perception of isolation would not be out of place in the
corrosive community.9 6
A look at survey results further illustrates litigation's disparate
impact upon community members. In 2006, researchers first asked
Cordoba residents (both litigants and non-litigants) questions tailored to
measure intrusive stress, stemming from the protracted litigation in
Baker.97 Next, they asked the same questions, but specifically in
reaction to the Supreme Court's ruling in Baker, one year after the
decision in 2009. The survey questions and results are appended to
this Note.
Overall, litigants responded overwhelming in the affirmative to all of
the questions versus non-litigants. 99 For example, when asked if, over
the last seven days, they had thought about the litigation against their
will, 68% of litigants replied affirmatively, while only 38% of nonlitigants had the same reaction. 00 When asked about the Supreme Court
decision, again, litigants outperformed non-litigants by 55% to 32%.0
90. Recreancy is the loss of trust in governmental institutions. Picou, DisasterLitigation,
supra note 47, at 1503, 1507.
91. Id. at 1503, 1508.
92. See Picou, supra note 17, at 81.
93. See id.
94. Id.; Picou, DisasterLitigation, supranote 47, at 1511.
95. Picou, DisasterLitigation, supranote 47, at 1508 (indicating that litigants achieved a
standardized coefficient of 0.102, while fishermen, as a class, score the highest with 0.208).
96. See Elliot & Penaloza, supra note 40 (reporting that the psychological effects of
technological disasters are compounded for victims who withdraw from their communities,
particularly in a culture that values self-reliance and shuns outside assistance).
97. See Picou, supra note 17, at 84.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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For instance, when questioned about whether they had difficulty falling
asleep because of the appearance of traumatic images relating to the
spill in their mind, 20% of litigants, compared to 10% of non-litigants,
replied affirmatively.102 Again, when thoughts concerned the Supreme
Court decision, litigants reported over three times the rate of disruption
at 21% versus 6% of non-litigants.103
Picou's statistics demonstrate the destructive connection between
litigation and the corrosive community effect. In doing so, the data sets
forth a terrible irony: the institution victims of EVOS turned for redress,
the adversarial court system, was also their single greatest source of
trauma following the spill.
B.

Troubling Legal Precedentfor Recovery of Corrosive
Community Damage

The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill not only fundamentally altered the lives
of its victims, but also how the legal system responds to technological
disasters. Its legal legacy includes the creation of the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 (OPA) and the cap on punitive damages in the Baker decision.
In the OPA, Congress expanded the scope of damages available to
spill victims.104 Specifically, Congress amended the Clean Water Act
and assembled a comprehensive framework governing defenses and
damage limitations that may arise from a spill.'s The OPA also created
strict liability for several types of spill-related damages.106 These
include: removal costs; natural resource damages;1o7 property damage,
102.
103.

Id.
Id. Specifically, Picou found far-reaching trends from this result in particular:
The seriousness of the psychological stress produced is obvious given that
intrusive problems related to sleep and dreams continued to persist long after
the final legal decision was rendered. Ostensibly, the outcome of twenty years
of adversarial legalism has not produced communal or psychological recovery
for EVOS survivors. In reality, the litigation process and specific court rulings
resulted in a series of emergent stressors that continuously re-victimized the
plaintiffs. The litigation served as a constant reminder of the EVOS and the
court rulings produced anger, injured the psychological wellbeing of plaintiffs,
maintained uncertainty, and denied any degree of recovery for communities
impacted by the spill.

Id. at 85.
104. Film Guide, Alliance for Justice, Crude Justice: Factual Background and Legal
Framework Governing Gulf Oil Spill Claims, [hereinafter Crude Justice], http://www.afj.org/
connect-with-the-issues/the-corporate-court/crudejustice/crude-justice-factual-background-an
d-legal-overview.pdf (last visited June 11, 2011).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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including economic loss; the loss of "subsistence use," or the use of
natural resources for survival; the loss of government revenue; and
finally, profit-loss and impaired earning capacity. 0 8
However, the OPA does not provide for punitive damages, and all
existing damage claims must adhere to a three-year statute of
limitations. 109 Considering the gradual nature of the corrosive
community effectilo and the omission of provisions that address longterm damage to community health, EVOS victims were left to lick
many of their own wounds. In light of the tremendous toll, including
suicides that community corrosion inflicted, the omission is glaring.
Without a statutory claim, EVOS plaintiffs in Baker placed their
hopes for full community restoration upon a $5 billion punitive damage
award from the initial jury trial."' But as has been shown, Exxon
successfully fought the award up to the Supreme Court. 112 As survey
results demonstrate,113 the Court's decision in Baker became yet another
source of trauma for plaintiff communities.14 But the Baker decision is
also the part of the story of EVOS' victims that is guaranteed to play a
role in Gulf Coast communities' fight for complete compensation from
BP."15

[Damages covered] total[] the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, and/or
acquiring the equivalent of the damaged natural resources; the diminution in
value pending restoration; and cost of assessing the damages. State and federal
trustees, acting on behalf of the public, are responsible for calculating these
damages and overseeing a plan for the resources' restoration.
See id. (citations omitted); see 15 C.F.R. § 990 (2011).
108. See Crude Justice, supra note 104 (citing 15 C.F.R. 990).
109. Id.
110. See supra Part II.A.
111. Liptak, supra note 16.
112. See id.
113. See Appendix Table 2.
114. See supra Part II.A.
115. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Looking for Liability in BP's Gulf Oil Spill,
NYTIMES.COM (June 7, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/looking-for-liability-inbps-gulf-oil-spill/?scp=2&sq=Exxon%20Shipping%2OCo.%20v.%20Baker&st=cse.

One area in which the Exxon Valdez spill may actually help BP and
Transocean is the limit the Supreme Court imposed on punitive damages in its
2008 decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, which only allows such
damages up to the amount of compensatory damages awarded. Juries in the
Gulf Coast region will remember this spill long after its effects are mitigated,
but the limit on punitive damages may keep down the costs of the disaster
somewhat.
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Exxon came before the Court in 2008, seeking certiorari on multiple
grounds, including on the question of whether the Ninth Circuit's
was "grossly excessive
judgment of $2.5 billionll6 in punitive damages
7
in violation of substantive due process."" Exxon desired a ruling that
would find punitive damages en totale to be violations of substantive
due process, effectively wiping them out." 8 Although the Court found
the award "excessive," 1 l 9 it skirted the issue of substantive due
process,120 choosing instead, to cap punitive damages at no more than
the total compensatory damages awarded under maritime law.121 As
discussed, this left plaintiffs, many of whom by the date of the decision
had long lost their livelihoods following the spill, with a total of
$30,000 to show for a nearly two-decade court fi ht.122 To many, the
Baker decision was a final insult to years of injury.
Thus, the major lessons of EVOS are two-fold. First, communities
are vulnerable to community corrosion in the aftermath of a
technological disaster. Second, protracted litigation can unleash a
second wave of trauma by developing the rift between litigants and nonlitigants and making it all but certain that serious community corrosion
will occur. As a corollary to this, EVOS also demonstrates that current
doctrine does not address this foreseeable damage from a technological
disaster.
The rest of this Note focuses on what this all means for victims of
the BP Oil Spill and how policymakers can head off further community
corrosion in the Gulf Coast.

III.

A COMPARISON OF THE GULF OIL SPILL TO THE
EXXON DISASTER

A.

The Son of Exxon

Not long after the Deepwater Horizon exploded, signs began to
emerge that the BP Oil Spill was bearing many of the same hallmarks as
Id.
116. The Ninth Circuit slashed the initial jury award by half before reaching the Supreme
Court. See supraPart I.C.
117. Gash, supra note 20, at 545 (citing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (No. 07-219).
118. See Gash, supra note 20, at 575-76.
119. Id.at583.
120. Id. at 529, 576, 583.
121. See supra Part I.C.
122. See Liptak, supra note 16.
123. Id.
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that in Alaska, two decades earlier, but on a far greater scale. "It's
almost like Exxon Valdez fast-forward," proclaimed Picou when
interviewed the December following the BP blowout.1 24 Indeed, within
weeks, the BP Oil Spill had eclipsed EVOS as the greatest
environmental disaster in U.S. history. 1 For Gulf Coast residents, the
massive environmental impact is only the tip of the iceberg.
Along the Gulf Coast, mental health has rapidly deteriorated. In
South Mobile County, Alabama, 18% of residents expressed serious
signs of mental illness, 20% exhibited sub-clinical signs, 37% exhibited
mild signs and another 25% possessed moderate signs of mental health
concerns. 6 Already, two people have taken their lives for reasons
directly related to the BP Oil Spill.127 In sharp contrast, the first spillrelated suicides reported in Alaska occurred around four years after

EVOS.1 28
From July 19th to July 25th, 2010, the National Center for Disaster
Preparedness at the Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia
University, conducted a survey of 1200 Gulf Coast residents in
Louisiana and Mississippi. 129 Dr. Irwin Redlender, the President and
Center Director of the Children's Health Fund, the survey's sponsor,
stated that results indicated "a persistent and overwhelming level of
anxiety among families living near the coast, driven by both medical
symptoms in their children as well as a substantial level of
psychological stress." 30 "If it wasn't for my children," said one
Alabama Gulf Coast resident,'31 "I probably would have already
124. Elliot & Penaloza, supra note 40.
125. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill
(June 15, 2010, 08:01 PM EST), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill ("Already, this oil spill is the worst environmental
disaster America has ever faced.").
126. Eliott & Penaloza, supra note 40 (noting that the mental health issues of BP Oil Spill
victims in one Gulf Coast area, South Mobile County, Alabama, appears to supersede that of
Cordoba residents when both subjects were surveyed for mental illness five months following
their respective technological disasters).
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. Aaron Hofer is a twenty-seven year old Iraq War veteran and a fourth-generation
shrimper in Bayou La Batre, Alabama. Id. The spill resulted in the loss of his entire shrimping
season, forcing the business where he worked part time cleaning crabs. Id. He is now homeless,
living out of his boat, as his wife and two young children shuttle between her relative's homes.
Id. As his economic situation spiraled downward, so has his relationship with his wife. Id. They
have separated twice; a situation that led Mr. Hofer to contemplate suicide off the eight story of
a building, until he decided to back down. Id. Lena Hofer, Aaron's wife, believes her husband is
taking the loss of his ability to economically provide for their family harder than his time at war.
Id.
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committed suicide."1 32
Time will reveal the long-term consequences of the BP Oil Spill on
Gulf Coast communities, but one thing is certain: the impact of the
corrosive community is already deeper in the Gulf than it was for
several years following the Exxon Valdez disaster. The explanation for
this is currently under examination, but already mental health experts
and sociologists point to the lingering effects of another disaster on the
Gulf.
Hurricane Katrina was the region's first hit in the one-two punch of
disasters between 2005 and 2010. In the words of Dr. Arwen Podesta, a
psychiatrist at Tulane University in New Orleans, "I've seen a lot of
people teetering on the edge of wellness since Katrina who now have
increased fears and are decompensating into severe depression and
resurgence of PTSD from Katrina."' 33
However, along most of the Gulf Coast, communities' experience
with Katrina was that of a powerful natural disaster. In New Orleans, on
the other hand, the destruction became technological when the levies
broke the morning after the storm made landfall.134 Therefore, it is
possible that for much of the Gulf, the psychological and emotional
impacts of Katrina have been mitigated by the emergency of a postnatural disaster therapeutic community.
Nevertheless, the Gulf Coast's very identity could be making its
communities uniquely vulnerable to corrosion.
B. A BriefOverview of Gulf Coast Communities
As in Cordova, the mental health impact is compounded in Gulf
Coast communities by their inextricable link to the environment.135
Most vulnerable are renewable resource communities or RRCs, where
there is little occupational variety outside of commercial fishing other
132. Id.
133. See Jamail, supra note 51. Dr. Arwen Podesta continues, "I work in addiction and
I've seen a lot of increase in alcohol and other drugs, domestic violence and making severe
threats about suicide, or threats towards their spouse and children. I'm seeing that more often
now, directly related to the fear of what may happen to the livelihoods, lifestyles and economics
of folks being directly affected." Id.
134. See id.
135. See Mireya Navarro, Add Psyche of Gulf Workers to Spill s Toll, N.Y. TIMES (June
16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/us/17human.html?scp=3&sq=impact%20of/2
OBP%20 oil%20spill%20on%20fishermen&st=cse (reporting on the emergence of PTSD among
Gulf Coast fishermen, the high demand for mental health services and the unique vulnerabilities
of the Vietnamese and Cajun fishing communities); see also Susan Saulny, Cajuns on Gulf
Worry They May Need to Move Again, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
(reporting on the economic,
2010/07/19/us/19cajun.html?scp=2&sq=cajun+bp+&st-nyt
psychological and cultural damage done to the Louisiana Cajun community after the BP Oil
Spill).
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than the businesses directly supported by the fishing industry, from
processing plants to local restaurants.136 Renewable resource
communities are also largely cash-based economies,' 3 7 a fact that
recently added to the frustration over compensation because the Gulf
Coast Claims Facility, the organization that oversees the BP Claims
Process, requires documentation. 3 8
In addition, like Cordoba and greater Prince William Sound, the Gulf
is home to several communities with long-standing connections to the
health of their environment. Take, for example, just two of the proud
cultural groups of the Gulf Coast: the Cajuns and Vietnamese. For many
Cajuns, descendants of French-Canadians who immigrated to the
bayous of the Gulf in the eighteenth and nineteen centuries, a tradition
of commercial fishing may no longer be viable.139 Still, most are
reluctant-and unable-to relocate or take up a different occupation
than the one that has been in their family for generations.140
The Gulf is also where the Catholic Archdiocese successfully
relocated thousands of Vietnamese refugees, following the conclusion
of the Vietnam War.141 The refugees, a large percentage coming from
South Vietnam, a region with an established fishing tradition, quickly
reestablished their craft along the Gulf of Mexico.142 However, since the
136. See Saulny, supra note 135 (reporting that most Cajuns in a southern Louisiana
Bayou are either fishermen or work in a support occupation, such as net-crafting or seafood
processing. In essence, the entire economy revolves around harvesting Gulf seafood).
137. Elliot & Penaloza, supra note 40 (reporting that "[t]he Hofers received just $1,700 for
their emergency six-month payment, because much of Aaron's pay was in cash and he doesn't
have the proper documentation").
138. See id.
139. See Saulny, supra note 135.
The oil spill has delivered a dose of misery for all those who live intimately
with the land here. But for the Cajuns, whose rustic French-American culture is
almost wholly dependent on the natural bayous that open to the Gulf of
Mexico, it has forced the question of whether they can preserve their way of
life-and if so, at what cost?
Id.
140.

Id.
Many Cajuns can count on a few fingers the number of miles they have moved
away from parents or grandparents. Ask Randy Jones, a deckhand on the
Heaven Bound, how many generations his family has lived along Bayou Petit
Caillou and he answers, "All of them." Typical of many here, he cannot fathom
another way of life.

Id.
141. See Navarro,supra note 135.
142. Id.
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BP Oil Spill, the Vietnamese fishing community has faced serious
challenges, many stemming from persistent language and cultural
barriers between them and officials. 14
Furthermore, across all demographics, the fishing communities of
the Gulf Coast are imbibed with a sense of stubborn independence that
ironically leaves members vulnerable to mental illness. 144 Mental health
providers report seeing far fewer patients than community-based
surveys indicate to be in need of counseling and diagnosis, due in part
to the stigma of seeking outside help.145
Psychologist Steve Barrilleaux, coordinator of adult services at the
Gulf Coast Mental Health Center, states that "[p]art of the spirit of
being a commercial fisherman has to do with independent thinking,
being your own boss, [and] being in control of yourself."l 46 "These
people," says Barrilleaux, "are the last true hunter and gatherers on
earth, when you think about it. They have a sense of-I wouldn't say
invincibility-but a sense of self-reliance: 'No matter what, we can
handle it."' 47 This very outlook worsens the spill induced trauma that
communities are suffering. 4 8
C. LSNF PreliminaryData: Signs of Corrosionin the Florida
Gulf Coast?
This same self-reliant attitude has also affected community outreach
to legal services along the Florida Gulf Coast. Legal Services of North
Florida (LSNF) collected intake data from its indigent clients through
the fall of 2010. The first report of their findings to the national Legal
Services Corporation in Washington presented scant data, even though
the BP Oil Spill outreach effort and collecting office were in the very
same Florida fishing communities where the need for legal aid was
expected to be the greatest in the state.149
Between September 16th and October 15th 2010, LSNF reported
From April 20th to
only one case related to the BP Oil Spill.'
143. Id.
144. See Elliot & Penaloza, supranote 40.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. Shrimper Aaron Hofer adds that, while growing up, he was taught not to seek the
help of "outsiders" and that "you take care of your own," but after the spill he recognizes the
damages this has attitude has caused his family. Id.
149. The LSNF collecting office is located in Pensacola and serves the fishing
communities stretching to the Florida and Alabama border. See Legal Services of North Florida,
http://www.lsnf.org/ (last visited June 29, 2011).
150. Response to Request for Information Pertaining to the Gulf Oil Spill from Legal Serv.
of N. Florida, Inc. (Sept. 16-Oct. 15, 2010).
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September 15th, the entire period in which the spill was ongoing, only
three cases were directly linked to the disaster. However, when LSNF
received a grant to conduct a disaster outreach program, the numbers
jumped. Between October 16th and November 23rd, 2010, the total
number of cases directly related to the spill at one legal service office
rose to eighteen. 5 2
Thus, across the Gulf Coast, signs of community corrosion are
growing. The Gulf's vulnerability to future downward spirals of mental
health cannot be understated. Between troubling mental health statistics,
the cultural stigma toward outside assistance, and the long-lasting
environmental and economic impacts of this spill, the communities of
the Gulf are a powder keg for psychological decay. But that is not all.
As Picou's data has illustrated, litigation created a secondary trauma for
the victims of the Exxon Valdez disaster, impeding recovery over two
decades.' 53 As more than 300 federal lawsuits, in addition to thousands
of state claims,1 54 make their way through the adversarial court system,
the long-term recovery of Gulf Coast communities is in peril.'
D. The BP Claims Process:Reducing the Pool of Plaintiffs, but at
What Cost?
With the dangers of unfettered litigation apparent, it is time to
examine the one way this crisis substantially differs from EVOS.
The Gulf Coast Claims Facility' 5 6 was established by the Obama
Administration to manage an alternative to litigation: the BP Claims
Process. The BP Claims Process is an arbitration model consisting of a

151. Id.
152. Response to Request for Information Pertaining to the Gulf Oil Spill from Legal Serv.
of N. Florida, Inc. (Oct. 16-Nov. 23, 2010).
153. See Part II.A.
154. See Anderson & Hayes, supra note 15.
155. See Jarvis, supra note 9.
156. See Crude Justice, supra note 104:
After the explosion, BP admitted responsibility and vowed to pay "all
legitimate claims." Initially, BP administered the claims system, but after
negotiations with the Obama Administration, BP agreed to place $20 billion in
a Gulf Coast Claims Facility trust find ("GCCF") to be administered by
Kenneth Feinberg. Individuals and businesses can submit claims to the Fund
for removal costs and other economic damages. Mr. Feinberg will have broad
latitude to determine which claims will be paid and in what amounts. He has
repeatedly touted the fact that he will make decisions independently from both
BP and the White House.
Id.
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$20 billion claims fund,157 which is funded by BP and chaired by
attorney Kenneth Feinberg,' 5 8 an Obama appointee. The advantages of
such a system versus litigation seem clear-cut. First, application is
freel 5 9 and assistance online, by phone, or in various claims facilities
with an individual's claim is easily available.' 60
In practice, however, cracks in the process quickly appeared. For
instance, by October 1, some 315,000 claims for emergency six-month
payments had been filed, but only 92,000 claims had been paid or
approved.161 As of November Ist, 20,000 claims had been rejected, up
from just 125 denials by the end of September. 162 For those who have
received emergency payments, full payment is rare.
Before late November 2010, claimants could file for emergency
relief, which evaluated their claim under a less-stringent standard and
did not require individuals to waive their right to litigation.164 On
November 24, 2010, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility gave claimants the
option of filing an interim claim, which does not require an individual to
forgo the right to litigation, or a final claim-which does.
The legal advocacy group, Alliance for Justice, details the recent
updates to the process this way:
Applying for a final payment does not obligate claimants to
accept GCCF's offer; a claimant may forego [sic] the offer for a
final payment and still opt to bring a claim in court. Victims will
have three years to submit claims for final or interim payments,
157. See BP Establishes $20 Billion Claims Fund for Deepwater Horizon Spill and
Outlines Dividend Decisions (June 16, 2010), http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?category
Ld=2012968&contentld=7062966.
158. Kimberly Kindy, Overseer of BP's Gulf Spill Claims Fund Gets His Hands Dirty,
WASH. PosT (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/
19/AR2010101907240.html.
159. Frequently Asked Questions About the BP Claims Process, BP.COM,
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp intemet/globalbp/globalbpuk english/incidentresponse/ST
AGING/localassets/downloadsjdfs/FAQs about theBPClaimsProcess.pdf (last visited
July 30, 2011).
160. Id.
161. Brian Skoloff, Number ofDeniedBP Claims Rises Sharply, ASSOCIATED PREss, Nov.
1, 2010, availableat http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39956880/ns/us_news-environment/.
162. Id.
163. See Elliot & Penaloza, supra note 40 (describing the experience of a recently
homeless fourth generation shrimper, Aaron Hofer, whose family received $1700 as a six-month
emergency payment because Hofer's occupation traditionally worked in cash); see also Skoloff,
supra note 161 (describing the experience of beach wedding planner, Sheryl Lindsay, who
claimed $240,000 in lost earnings, resulting in $7700 in six-month emergency pay without
explanation).
164. See Crude Justice, supra note 104.
165. Id.
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with a filing deadline of August 23, 2013. After that point in
time, claims can still be submitted to BP in accordance with the
terms of OPA.
In addition to final and interim claims, individuals and
businesses can now also file for a Quick Payment Final Claim
("Quick Pay"). Any individual or business who has received an
emergency or interim payment is eligible to receive a Quick Pay
of $5,000 for individuals and $25,000 for businesses, with no
additional documentation requirements. Accepting a Quick Pay
requires signing the waiver of all claims except bodily injury or
death against BP and other potentially liable parties.' 66
Thus, victims of the BP Oil Spill face a daunting choice: pursue the
BP claims process in hopes of at least partial immediate compensation,
or risk mounting costs and a protracted battle in the courts for perhaps a
very large jury award, but one that precedent now dramatically caps.167
It is a gamble every victim now faces.

IV.

How

To RESTORE THE GULF COAST

A. Short-Term: Disaster Claims Mediation in Florida
Currently, individuals dissatisfied with their final claim offer from
the BP Claims Process have the option to appeal to the U.S. Coast
Guard under the OPA.16 8 However, of the 507 appeals filed as of
February 2011, the Coast Guard has yet to side once with the
claimant.' 6 9
With tens of thousands of claims already rejected, Gulf Coast
residents need a more transparent, reliable way of appealing the
decisions of the BP Claims Process. State-wide mediation programs
may provide a viable alternative. The Collins Center, a Florida publicpolicy think tank, spear-headed the effort to coordinate large-scale
claims mediations after the hurricane season of 2004 and the foreclosure
crisis of 2008.170 Their program to provide home-owners the
opportunity to mediate with their banks to avoid foreclosure
proceedings was so effective that the Florida Supreme Court ordered all
166. Id. (citations omitted).
167. See Liptak, supranote 16.
168. John Schwartz & Mark Schrope, Report Foresees Quick Gulf of Mexico Recovery,
N.Y. TIMES.COM (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/02/us/02spill.html?scp=1&sq
=%22Report%20Foresees%20Quick%20Gulf/o20of/o20Mexico%20Recovery/o22&st=cse.
169. Id.
170. Interview by author of Ned Pope, Vice President of Program Development, The
Collins Center (Oct. 14, 2010).
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foreclosure actions into mandatory mediation in 2009.171
The foreclosure mediation program was so successful because of the
unique partnership built between the Collins Center and the Florida Bar
Foundation (FBF), the Florida Bar's trust for pro bono and public
service work.172 The organizations developed a program called Florida
FBF encouraged attorneys to
Attorneys Saving Homes (FL.A.S.H.).
participate by permitting the time spent on a FL.A.S.H. mediation to
count toward total annual pro bono hours. The attorney and client would
then meet a certified mediator in a designated location, with the bank
appearing by phone. In other words, the bank's attorney would call
in. 74 All client consultations prior to mediation were conducted by
175
phone between the attorney and client, increasing efficiency.
According to Ned Pope, Vice President of Program Development for
the Collins Center, such a program for BP claims disputes could appear
overnight, assuming there is the political will to back a BP Claims
FL.A.S.H-type program. Pope adds, however, that the FL.A.S.H.
program was not perfect.176 In order for a similar program to work for
Gulf Coast residents, eligibility requirements should be sufficiently
loose to permit the greatest amount of individuals to partake in the
process.' Also, he suggests that the Florida Bar Foundation should
consider easing its own restrictions on when and how attorneys can
receive pro bono hours for mediation participation.1
Nevertheless, BP Claims state mediation programs, like FL.A.S.H.,
can arrive tomorrow and begin work on the same day. All that is needed
is a policymaker to say "go."
B. Long-Term: An Outline of the Social Trust Model
Long-term solutions to the corrosion occurring in the Gulf Coast are
not as simple to implement. As already established, current legal
doctrine has no remedy for the very real damages a technological
disaster unleashes-and the protracted litigation that results. Yet, states
and the federal government have the duty to prevent what happened in
Alaska after EVOS from reoccurring in the Gulf Coast. One way
policymakers could prevent community corrosion in future oil spills and
slow the degradation of Gulf Coast communities is by establishing a
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.

252

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 22

"Social Trust Model." 179
The Social Trust Model is modeled from the OPA's Natural
Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) process and the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF).1 80 Congress passed both provisions to
compensate for damage exclusively to natural resources and for direct,
physical property damage claims.'' The OSLTF was developed to
ensure the availability of federal funds for future oil spills, should the
party responsible be unable to compensate for cleanup and damage
claims. It also taxes major oil companies that operate in U.S. waters
and includes that income in the trust to fund the post-disaster
assessment. 8 3
The NRDA, on the other hand, not only implements a quantitative
assessment program to put a number on the cost of natural resource
damage, but also identifies government and community actors as stakeholders, or trustees. 84 These trustees will be the recipients of funds
from the OSLTF to restore environmental loss.' 8 5 Of course, this is a
remarkably simple overview of existing environmental programs, but
the ideas at their heart should be seriously considered in light of the
community corrosion occurring after oil spills.
Thus, the Social Trust Model could be funded by either an increase
in the current OSLTF tax on oil corporations or by a separate additional
tax. Next, using the existing framework, community trustees would
need to be identified. Examples of appropriate trustees could be Legal
Aid and Legal Services Providers, community-health organizations, and
local governments.
This is only a glimpse at the potential that lies in current
environmental law doctrine when it comes to addressing the very real
concern of community corrosion.
CONCLUSION

It will take years, likely decades, for the Gulf Coast of the United

179. The Social Trust Model is an original term coined by the author, but the specifics of
this outline arose from the suggestions of Professor Mary Jane Angelo of the Environmental
Law Department, University of Florida Levin College of Law and Professor Joan Flocks, Social
Policy Director of the Center for Governmental Responsibility, University of Florida Levin
College of Law.
180. See 15 C.F.R. 990; 33 U.S.C. § 2714(b)(1) (1990).
181. See Crude Justice, supra note 104.
182. Id.
183. See 33 U.S.C. § 2714 (1990).
184. Id.
185. Id.
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States to fully recover from the BP Oil Spill.186 However, there is hope
that by understanding the mechanisms that undercut recovery and
prolonged the trauma for the victims of EVOS, the same mistakes will
not be repeated. Nevertheless, this current disaster presents challenges
of a greater magnitude than EVOS, both in the scale of the Gulf Oil
Spill's contamination of the physical environment' and in the depths
in which it has already corroded the fabric of communities. 8 8
Though the date of recovery is uncertain, a few things are now clear.
First, community corrosion is real, as demonstrated by ample research
from EVOS.189 Second, signs of corrosion are numerous in the Gulf and
are growing.190 Third, current doctrine does not provide for a means to
compensate for community corrosion, nor does policy exist to even
address it.19' As a corollary to this, the BP Claims Process is one
alternative to litigation, but it possesses significant drawbacks for
claimants.192 Finally, short-term policy-ideas, such as state mediation
programs and long-term concepts like the Social Trust Model, give hope
that the cycle of disaster upon disaster, following a massive oil spill,
may one day be broken.

186. Mark Guarino & Peter N. Spotts, Gulf Oil Spill's Environmental Impact: How Long
to Recover?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 10, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/
051 0/Gulf-oil-spill-s-environmental-impact-How-long-to-recover.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See supra PartsI & II.
190. See supra Part III.
191. See id.
192. See supra Part III.D.
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Appendix
Table 2. Intrusive Stress Items for the EVOS Litigation
(2006) and the EVOS Supreme Court Decision (2009). 193

OVER THE LAST SEVEN DAYS...

2006

2009 Supreme

Litigation

Court Decision

Litigant

Non

Litigant

Non

I thought about the litigation/Supreme
Court Decision when I did not want to
(% sometimes or often).

68

38

55

32

Image related to the litigation/Supreme
Court Decision popped into my head
(% sometimes or often).

59

35

50

27

I had trouble falling asleep or staying
Asleep because images or thoughts of
The litigation/Supreme Court Decision
came into my mind (% sometimes or
often).

20

10

21

6

I had waves of strong feelings about the
Litigation/Supreme Court decision
(% sometimes or often).

72

49

58

34

I
had
dreams
about
litigation/Supreme Court decision
(% sometimes or often).

15

5

10

2

69

43

58

41

the

Reminders of it brought back feelings I
First felt about the litigation/Supreme
Court decision (% sometimes or often).

193. J. Steven Picou, When the Solution Becomes the Problem: The Impacts ofAdversarial
Litigation on Survivors of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 68, 84 (2009).

